European integration, trade, and globalization: Eastern Europe's response to Chinese competition

Andrea Ciani Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Karsten Mau Maastricht University SBE

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Background: Chinese Expansion

Major **transitions** in the organization and geographical structure of international trade during the last 30 years

Most relevant: integration of China in the global trading system



Note: UN Comtrade data, import market share for average HS6 manufacturing product.

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Background: European Integration

- Economic integration between EU15 and Eastern European (ESE) countries since the last decade of last century
- Significant trade liberalizations which increased trade flows between EU15 and ESE



Note: UN Comtrade data, aggregate import market share.

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What we know

Effects on import competing industries: firms, workers \rightarrow Mixed findings

- Effects on firms in 12 European countries (Bloom et al., 2016)
 - Negative impact on employment and firm survival
 - Firms switch into less exposed, more capital intensive industries
- Effects on employment in Germany (Dauth et al., 2014)
 - Minor employment effects, due to the preceding expansion of Eastern Europe
 - Negative effects are more than offset by new export opportunities

What are the effects on $\boldsymbol{competing}\xspace$ exporters? \rightarrow no systematic results

- ▶ Dauth et al. (2014): Germany diverts sources of its imports
 - China replaces exports of Southern European countries (e.g., Italy, Greece)
 - Interactions with Eastern European exports unanswered

▶ Silgoner et al. (2015): Chinese competition had a negligible effect on ESE exports

This study

We focus on two questions:

- 1. How **large** is the impact of Chinese competition on Eastern & Southeast European exports in the EU15?
 - Present first systematic evidence for this group of countries
 - Work on established identification methods to accommodate our data structure
 - Compare with related studies (Utar & Torres Ruiz, 2013: China vs Mexico in the US)

"We don't have big volumes of cheap products. In big volumes China has an advantage. But specialized production in small volumes, where logistics are important, are our market — that's where we have an advantage."

Rocio Ruiz, former Mexican Trade and Industry Minister (Financial Times, 2003)

- 2. Is there a role for geographic proximity and the shipping time to deliver goods?
 - > Proximity can be important (Evans and Harrigan 2005: regional supply networks)
 - Elasticity of trade/exports w.r.t. shipping times (Djankov et al. 2010)
 - Parts and components are more time sensitive (Hummels and Schaur, 2013)
 - ⇒ Differential responses have strong policy implications

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Preview of findings

Product-level evidence: HS6-level exports by 16 ESE countries, 1997-2007

- About 12.81% reduction of ESE product-level exports in the EU15
- Displacement is 40% smaller in 'time-sensitive' industries
- Minor differences across exporters, EU membership does not improve resilience
- ESE ship to fewer destinations, but flows become less concentrated in a single destination

Firm-level evidence: HS6-level exports of Bulgarian firms, 2001-2006

- Export displacement is 3.21% at the firm-product level
- Minor/insignificant effects in time-sensitive industries
- Multi-destination exporters are less affected, effects on multi-product exporters are ambiguous

Implications:

- Effects of Chinese competition on ESE somewhat smaller than those on Mexican firms in the US (Utar and Torres Ruiz, 2013)
- Integration in regional production networks could shield against Chinese competition

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Data and estimation framework *Main data sources*

Product-level data: UN Comtrade statistics - BACI (Cepii)

- HS6 manuf. goods (HS Chapters 28-96)
- Imports by EU15 countries (BLX = 1 country)
- ► Focus on imports from <u>16 ESE countries</u> (different stages of the EU integration process)
- Sample period: 1997-2007, unbalanced panel
- \Rightarrow f.o.b. value of exports from country *i* to EU15 destination *j* in product *k* and year *t*.

Firm-level data: Exporter Dynamics Database (EDD)

- Exports by Bulgarian firms to EU15 destinations
- HS6 manuf. products
- Information on value (USD) and quantity (kg)
- Sample period: 2001-2006, unbalanced panel
- \Rightarrow f.o.b. value of exports by firm f in product k and year t to EU15 destination j.

Set of Countries

Measurement and identification

China's market share as a measure of competition:

$$s_{jkt}^{CN} = \frac{M_{jkt}^{CN}}{M_{jkt}}$$

Bartik instrument: widely used in empirical studies on Chinese impact

Cross-sectional variation across industries/sectors

$$China_{kt} = \underbrace{\frac{\sum_{n \neq j} M_{nkt}^{CN}}{\sum_{n \neq j} M_{nkt}}}_{\text{cross-product-time variation}}$$

n = non-EU15 high-income countries (AUS, CAN, NZL, NOR, CHE)

- ▶ Cross-sectional component for $n \neq j$ avoids capturing j's preferences
- Time-varying component captures smooth/continuous evolution of Chinese supply capacities
- Instrument varies only in kt, but we need jkt

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Measurement and identification

Augmented Instrumental Variable

Predict differential penetration of $China_{kt}$ across j:

 $IV_{jkt} = China_{kt} \times w_j$

Weight w_{jb} based on information on Hong Kong re-exports

- GATT member since 1986, WTO since 1995 (also after handover to China in 1997)
- Important export-hub for Chinese goods, but mark-up for transportation/entrepôt services (Feenstra and Hanson 2004)



- Chinese imports of transport services from HK (share of total) decline after China's WTO entry
- Destination of HK re-exports proxy probability of Chinese expansion in j

define
$$w_j = \frac{REX_{j\bar{b}}^{HK}}{REX_{EU\bar{b}}^{HK}}$$
;
 $\bar{b} = avg(1999 - 2001)$

Source: World Bank Trade in Services Database.

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Empirical findings: *China's impact on ESE exports* Desc. Evidence Results for (log) export revenues: product-level and firm-level estimations

Data set	ESE e	(2) ct-level: xports -2007	(3) (4) Firm-level: Bulgaria 2001-2006		
	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	
China (s_{jkt}^{CN})	-1.222** (0.036)	-2.343** (0.158)	-0.651 (0.786)	-1.172^a (0.598)	
Import demand	0.569** (0.006)	0.576** (0.006)	0.363** (0.094)	0.229** (0.025)	
Observations N. Clusters Kleibergen-Paap (F-stat)	1,628,298 44,669	1,628,298 44,669 1,163.9	268,822 15,738	268,822 15,738 158.7	
Exporter-importer-HS6 FE Exporter-importer-year FE Firm FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark \checkmark	√ √ √	

Note: SE adjusted for clustering at product-destination level. Statistical significance: a = p < 0.1, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01.

- **ESE** pooled: $5.47 \times 1.222 = 6.68\%$ (OLS); $5.47 \times 2.343 = 12.81\%$ (IV estimation)
- Firm-level: $2.74 \times 1.172 = 3.21\%$ (IV)
- ► 2SLS coefficients are larger → OLS lower bound?
- Other Specifications Other IV

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Time-sensitivity

Measurement

 \Rightarrow Next question: Is there a role for geographic proximity?

- $\blacktriangleright\,$ Avg. sea distance of Chinese shipments to EU15: $\approx 15,000 {\rm km}$
- $\blacktriangleright\,$ Avg. transport time Guangzhou Rotterdam (20kts/hr): ≈ 20 days

Proxy of time-sensitivity (Hummels and Schaur 2013, US data)

HS2 level: time-sensitivity based on estimated mode-switching probability





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Time-sensitivity I Product-level estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Time-sensitivity: Sample/time-sens.:	binary (low	(median) binary (median) high full sample		continuous (SD = 1) full sample		
-	OLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS
Simple measure						
China's market share	-1.121**	-1.019*	-1.520**	-3.081**	-1.006**	-1.660**
	(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.043)	(0.163)	(0.041)	(0.183)
\times time-sensitivity	()	()	0.858* [*]	2.547* [*]	Ò.841**	2.476**
			(0.069)	(0.212)	(0.083)	(0.311)
Strict measure						
China's market share	-1.146**	-1.008*	-1.769**	-3.800**	-1.134**	-2.064**
	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.180)	(0.036)	(0.158)
\times time-sensitivity	. ,	. ,	ì.154**	3.340* [*]	0.597* [*]	1.687* [*]
			(0.066)	(0.201)	(0.042)	(0.128)

ESE exports, product-level 1997-2007: effect at least 40% smaller in time-sensitive industries

Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the product-destination level. Statistical significance: $^{a} = p < 0.1$, $^{*} = p < 0.05$, $^{**} = p < 0.01$. All specifications include ijk FE, ijt FE, and control variable (import demand).

Checks

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Time-sensitivity II Firm-level estimates

Bulgarian exports, 2001-2006

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Time S	ensitivity	Firm-le	vel OLS	Firm-level IV	
	Simpl	e, OLS	Qua	rtiles	Qua	artiles
Time-sens.	low	high				
China's market share	-1.567*	-0.135	-0.453**	-0.496**	-1.578*	-1.721**
	(0.639)	(0.985)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.619)	(0.620)
× High Q. time-sensitivity (<i>Simple</i>)			0.168		0.902	
			(0.215)		(0.654)	
imes High Q. time-sensitivity (<i>Strict</i>)				0.240		1.246^{a}
				(0.216)		(0.661)
Firm FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the product-destination level. Statistical significance: ${}^a = p < 0.1$, ${}^* = p < 0.05$, ${}^{**} = p < 0.01$. All specifications include *jk* FE, *jt* FE, and control variable (import demand).

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Results *Summary*

First study investigating China's impact on ESE exports using panel data analysis

 Finds significant impact of Chinese competition on product and firm level trade flows from Eastern Europe in the EU15

Focus on ESE's geographic proximity and time advantage over China

Substantially **smaller** displacement in time-sensitive industries

Differential effects across countries/firms suggest

- Similar effects across exporters, no significant advantage through EU membership Country-pair Candidate Vs Members
- Multi-destination firms are more resilient Multi firm

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Policy Considerations

- Trade literature finds that (Chinese) competition selects more productive and technologically advanced European firms
- Mixed welfare effects of trade competition (Workers...)
- Our results point towards plausible strategies for policy makers:
- 1 Integration in regional production networks could shield from external competition
- 2 Investments in (physical and non-physical) infrastructure connecting European production chains are important
- 3 Other initiatives aimed at "connecting" European firms are also valuable
- 4 Evidence speaks to recent developments \rightarrow China Belt and Road initiative

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Thank you!

ciani@dice.hhu.de

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Exporting countries in our product-level sample

ESE exporters at different stages of EU accession process



Dashed line: no EU membership candidate status, Light solid line: attained candidate status, Dark solid line: full EU member.

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Data and estimation framework: summary statistics back

ESE Product-level data (1997-2007): about 15% of potential trade flows

Focus on within-variation: i.e. flows with > 1 observation in ijk and ijt	
258,569 ijk triplets and 1.6 million observations in total (\approx 6 obs. per ijk)	

	Dimension	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
China's market share (s_{ikt}^{CN})	overall	0.070	0.126	0	0.987
	between		0.117	0	0.983
	within		0.055	-0.554	0.844
log ESE exports $(\ln X_{ijkt})$	overall	3.846	2.331	0	14.578
-	between		1.883	0	14.273
	within		1.211	-5.837	11.940

Bulgarian firm-level data (2001-2006): about 9,097 firms per year on average

Focus within-variation: i.e. flows with > 1 observation for each f and jk 124,280 fjk triplets and 211,724 observations in total (≈ 1.7 obs. per fjk)

	Dimension	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
China's market share (s_{ikt}^{CN})	overall	0.108	0.142	0	0.975
	between		0.144	0	0.948
	within		0.029	-0.374	0.590
log firm exports $(\ln X_{fjkt})$	overall	7.724	3.153	-0.782	20.411
	between		2.908	-0.782	19.703
	within		0.962	-1.890	15.166

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Distribution of HK re-exports across EU15



Source: UN Comtrade statistics, own calculations. Fractions denote share in total HK re-exports in years 1999-2001.

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Measurement and identification: *comparative descriptive analysis*

Both our measures suggest differential performance of ESE exports to EU15

- ▶ Baseline measure s_{jkt}^{CN} : faster Chinese expansion → slower ESE export growth
- Augmented Bartik IV_{jkt} : higher exposure \rightarrow slower ESE export growth



Empirical findings: robustness checks back

Product-level data, pooled ESE exporters 1997-2007

 \Rightarrow robust to alternative clustering, aggregation, and controlling for product-portfolio dynamics.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	OLS	2SLS	K-P F-Stat
Baseline	-1.222** (0.036)	-2.343** (0.158)	1,163.9
 Cluster products Aggregate EU15 Add FE kt Add FE kt + tariff_{ikt} Add FE ikt 	-1.222** (0.058)	-2.343** (0.240)	444.9
	-1.529** (0.108)	-2.044** (0.267)	411.0
	-0.661** (0.032)	-2.026** (0.548)	191.0
	-0.661** (0.032)	-2.040** (0.549)	191.1
	-0.646** (0.036)	-2.293** (0.590)	178.2

Note: Table shows estimated β (standard errors) for alternative specifications. First row shows baseline, row 2 and 3 have 3,903 and 3,921 clusters, respectively.

Firm-level data, Bulgarian exporters 2001-2006

 \Rightarrow robust to inclusion of time-varying firm-level controls.

Specification	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Baseline	Firm size, Large Firms	Firm seniority
OLS	-0.651 (0.786)	-1.773** (0.185)	-0.607 (0.778)
Bartik IV	$-1.172^a (0.598)$	-2.121** (0.377)	-1.967**(0.622)
MFA IV	$-1.793^* (0.684)$	-1.297* (0.553)	-1.533* (0.664)

Note: Table shows estimated β (standard errors) for alternative specifications. First column shows baseline. Column (2) interaction with dummy for large firm (= export revenues at the product level in t higher than the mean), column (3) for firm seniority (= years exporting a product).

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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Data/sample	ple Product-level ESE 1997-2007							Firm-level Bulgaria 2001-2006	
Instrument	Baseline	US F	NTR	MFA G	Quotas I	MFA Q	uotas II	MFA Q	uotas II
Estimation:	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS
China (s_{jkt}^{CN})	-2.343** (0.158)		-2.807** (0.398)		-2.648** (0.314)		-5.011** (0.329)		-1.793 (0.684
US PNTR	(0.200)	-1.119** (0.167)	(0.000)		(0.02.)		()		(
MFA Quota fill rate		(****)		-1.161** (0.126)		-2.597** (0.127)		-0.708** (0.259)	
Import demand	0.576** (0.006)	0.560** (0.006)	0.579** (0.007)	0.530** (0.010)	0.578** (0.012)	0.554* [*] (0.006)	0.593** (0.007)	0.206* ^{**} (0.023)	0.239* (0.025
Observations N. Clusters Kleibergen-Paap (F-stat)	1,628,298 44,669 1163.9	1,628,298 44,669	1,628,298 44,669 337.6	399,507 9,866	399,507 9,866 213.4	1,628,298 44,669	1,628,298 44,669 341.1	268,822 15,738	268,82 15,738 100.9
Importer-HS6 FE Importer-year FE Firm FE	√ √	√ √	√ √	√ √	√ √	√ √	√ √	√ √ √	\$ \$ \$

Empirical findings: alternative instruments (back)

Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering at product-destination level. Statistical significance: $^{a} = p < 0.1$, $^{*} = p < 0.05$, $^{**} = p < 0.01$.

Note on measurement

▶ US PNTR:
$$(\tau_k^{col2} - \tau_k^{MFN}) \times D_t (= 1 | year \ge 2002) \times w_j$$

• MFA Quota:
$$Fillrate_k \times D_{kt} (= 1 | removed) \times w_j$$

MFA Quotas I = only T&C subsample (i.e., HS Chapters 50-63)

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	(1)	(2) OLS Baseline s	(3) pecification	(5) IV (red.	(6) form)	
-	Interm. inputs	Skill- intensity	Contracting intensity	Combined	Combined	Placebo
China (s_{ikt}^{CN})	-1.858**	-1.807**	-1.818**	-2.343**	-5.104**	-1.083**
	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.077)	(0.106)	(0.370)	(0.336)
imes time-sensitivity	0.998**	1.026**	1.167**	0.925**	2.986**	-0.102
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.072)	(0.235)	(0.224)
\times intermediate input	0.508**	. ,	. ,	0.719**	1.648**	0.656*
	(0.073)			(0.095)	(0.283)	(0.255)
\times skill-intensity	. ,	0.570**		0.520**	0.994**	0.898*
		(0.089)		(0.090)	(0.289)	(0.360)
\times contracting-intensity		. ,	0.057	0.484**	1.324**	0.322
			(0.075)	(0.098)	(0.311)	(0.258)
- Observations	1,628,298	1,628,298	1,628,298	1,628,298	1,628,298	767,418
N. Clusters	44,669	44,669	44,669	44,669	44,669	38,703
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat					72.3	86.5

Robustness: time-sensitivity and other industry characteristics

Note: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at product-destination level. Statistical significance: ^a p < 0.1, ^{*} p < 0.05, ^{**} p < 0.01. All specifications include ijt and ijk FEs, control variable (import demand) suppressed.

- Time-sensitivity not mixed up with other industry characteristics
- Column (6): export response of low-wage Asian exporters

 these countries have no competitive advantage in time-sensitive industries (Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam)

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Heterogeneous effects

Country-pair specific coefficients

Interact Chinese competition with country-pair specific indicator I_{ij} back

 $\ln X_{ijkt} = \alpha + \beta s_{jkt}^{CN} + \beta^{ij} (s_{jkt}^{CN} \times I_{ij}) + \gamma \ln M_{jkt} + \mu_{ijk} + \mu_{ijt} + \nu_{ijkt}$

 $\hat{\beta}^{ij}$ indicates *differential response* for ij, estimate for each ij-combination



 \Rightarrow no sign. deviations in $\approx 75\%$ of $ij\mbox{-pairs};$ SEE less affected than EEC?

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Heterogeneous effects: EEC vs SEE and EU membership

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
Dep. var.: log export revenue	EEC	vs. SEE exp	orters	E	EU membership			
	OLS	Bartik IV	Bartik IV	OLS	Bartik IV	Bartik IV		
China (s_{ikt}^{CN})	-0.919**	-1.250**	-3.338**	-0.591**	-3.117**	-3.310		
	(0.046)	(0.206)	(0.846)	(0.052)	(0.850)	(2.165)		
$\times EEC_i$	-0.525**	-1.814**	1.774^{a}	0.088	3.493**	3.475**		
	(0.057)	(0.258)	(1.051)	(0.071)	(1.223)	(1.202)		
\times EU-member _{it}				-0.292**	-1.514**	-1.518**		
				(0.060)	(0.493)	(0.490)		
\times EU-candidate _{it}						0.219		
						(1.881)		
Observations	1,628,298	1,628,298	1,516,895	1,516,895	1,516,895	1,516,895		
N. Clusters	44,669	44,669	42,795	42,795	42,795	42,795		
Kleibergen-Paap (F-stat)		512.2	81.1		36.6	6.3		
Exporter-HS6-year FE			\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		

Note: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at product-destination level. Statistical significance: $^a p < 0.1$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$. All specifications include ijt and ijk FEs, control variable (import demand) suppressed.

 \Rightarrow EEC countries (esp. upon EU entry) seem to suffer more, but causality unclear

- IV estimates very imprecise and low F-statistic
 - reallocation of resources away from China-competing export lines?

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Heterogeneous effects

Multi-product and multi-destination firms

Firms face trade-off between size/productivity and flexibility back

- theory: Thesmar and Thoenig (2000), more recent: Macedoni and Xu (2018)
- related: standardization vs customization (Holmes and Stevens 2014)
 - small firms serving niche markets with customized products less affected by China

Assess differential response of

- multi-product exporters: sell > 1 HS6 good to any destination in t_0
- multi-destination exporters: sell one HS6 good to > 1 destination in t_0

	(1) (2) multi-destination		(3) multi	(4) -product
	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS
China's market share (jkt)	-2.377** (0.870)	-9.351** (1.199)	-1.051 (1.001)	-2.684** (0.944)
\times Multi-destination_{ft_0}	1.741** (0.345)	4.239** (0.295)	()	
$\times Multi-product_{ft_0}$	(,	(****)	0.399 (0.589)	1.508* (0.687)
Observations N. Clusters Kleibergen-Paap (F-stat)	268,822 15,738	268,822 15,738 31.8	268,822 15,738	268,822 15,738 79.3

Note: Standard adjusted for clustering at product-destination level. Statistical significance: a = p < 0.1, * = p < 0.05, $*^* = p < 0.01$. All regressions include product-destination, importer-year, and firm fixed effects. Log import demand includes a control variable (not displayed).

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Additional results

Geographical diffusion of ESE exports

New geographic patterns of ESE exports?

- ▶ use aggregated sample of *i*'s exports to $\sum j = EU15$
- extensive margin: number of exits from and entries into destinations
- intensive margin: share of exports shipped to main destination market (defined at t_0)

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	En	tries	E	×its	Share	e main
	OLS	Bartik IV	OLS	Bartik IV	OLS	Bartik IV
China's market share	0.013	-0.012	0.300*	1.784**	-0.084**	-0.900**
	(0.044)	(0.164)	(0.121)	(0.552)	(0.019)	(0.089)
Observations N. Cluster Kleibergen-Paap (F-stat)	209,495 3,283	209,495 3,283 225.7	209,495 3,283	209,495 3,283 225.7	209,495 3,283	209,495 3,283 225.7

Note: Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the product-level. Statistical significance: $^{a} = p < 0.1$, $^{*} = p < 0.05$, $^{**} = p < 0.01$. All specifications include ik-FE, it-FE, and control variable (import demand).

- (i) no impact on entries, but more exits \rightarrow fewer markets are served
- (ii) less exports to main destination \rightarrow remaining exports more evenly spread

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